November 20, 2017 
 Monday 
 
 

Forum
Topic:
CDAA Conduct

       

Page 1 | Page 2 | Page 3 | Page 4 | Page 5 | Page 6 | Page 7 ]

 By Rick

08/08/2007  10:09PM

Mike, and Don, and all of the rest of us out there, here's how my letter will read (first draft and only conceptual at this point):

We, the people, do not want non-representation by vigilante appointment loose to willy-nilly apply political notions contrary to the intent of the law.

We believe that our representative Republic will be at risk should illegal representatives mount positions of power and remain unchecked.

We, the people, expect law to be upheld, not re-interpted to fit into gray-area motives.

We believe that the review of this case has merit, citing the above points: that a non-representative body is using its power to usurp the intent of the law to its advantage, without shame.

Reviewing the intents of everything in this case, one has no other conclusion to draw.

With respect, we expect the Court will rule upon the intent of the law and such application.
 By SCOOP

08/08/2007  3:56PM

Mike: barring your catastrophic objection, here it will go:


Your various Honors, et al it might concern:

Re: Gail Filter et al v Sixteen to One, Miller

The language of the law may well not lend itself to poetry, but
neither should it lead to @#$%ery.

The violence done to our native tongue, our native rights and my
tediously if incompletely acquired sensibilities by the Court of
Appeals in the above referenced matter screams for review and redress.

That a California citizen cannot question a lawyer’s authority, even
a prosecutor’s authority, without being deemed to have interfered
with free speech stands the anti-SLAPP concept on its head.

For the sake of the law, for western civilization, for any hope of a
common citizen’s understanding, embrace of and pride in that law,
please take a careful look at this case.

Neither of two superior court judges found the underlying question
frivolous. We citizens of Sierra County are interested to know how
lawyers who assume, perhaps to say usurp, our name to prosecute
friends and neighbors become immune from the plainly worded
requirements of the law. We consider the issue of sufficient import
that we are insulted to have it dismissed through a perversion of the
anti-SLAPP statutes. A decent respect for our intelligence should
prompt the Supreme Court to address those issues left moot by the
Appeals Court.

Don Russell
Editor, The Mountain Messenger, Downieville
Yellow journal muckraker and harpy for freedom
 By Rick

07/28/2007  9:01PM

I hinted at this term (one I just now fashioned) in my last entry to Bluejay. I stated that I wasn't an "ecomomist", and most probably figured I had my spelling wrong or that my key-board had failed. (Crush would be proud.)

So, I will define the term now:

Ecomonist: (noun) 1) one who defines one's ecconomic situation by the success of others and defines one's own success as another's, keeping their success as the target for the eventual montetary redistribution; (2) one who studies how to achieve the above; (3) ibid, although "communist" is often the substitute; (4) the actions of a public sector entity bent on achieving through taxation and regulation that which could not be achieved within the private sector without such entity in place; (5) robbery; (6) a term disguised so well that if one has read this far would not recognize the motivation so clevery hidden in the name: environmental policy designed to distribute an ecconomic model based upon trumped-up eccologic pathology blaming humans for their own downfall while disguising it in a non-scientigfic model of importance, relegating the human above the creator of the very environment upon which they depend, or the ignorance of fact, that such scientific models ignore for economic gain the ongoing scientific realitity that this has already happened, many times before, keeping the "commonist" in chains for the fraudulent explanation; (7) the manipulation of truth to gain an eco-commonist outcome.
 By bluejay

07/25/2007  1:47PM

It doesn't take too much understanding to be aware of the growing number of crooks and abusers in our government and legal system.

This is what unbridled power and greed has led to. Sadly, people outside this country who read the real news understand this better than we do. Our way of life is being systemically destroyed and has been so for a good amount of time. Our legal rights and our currency's buying power aren't what they used to be.

The only financial hope for the common man is to own gold until positive steps are taken to stop and reduce the growing mountain of monetary expansion and debt.

In the background and through secret meetings plans are always being devised to take the public's attention away from gold. Even today, western central bankers are speaking of more gold sales which depressed the metals price lower to the $670 level.

The major gold producing companies are freightened to take issue with the manipulation of gold for fear of some form of retribution and legal expenses against a well entrenched evil force, mainly the banks with the influence they exert on governemnt employed officials, along with the Fed.

Someday hopefully, a dynamic individual will surface and start a grass roots movement resulting in punishment to those responsible for abusing our legal rights, our right to invest in gold companies without the price suppression of its product and our way of living which is being assaulted by our fiat currency.
 By martin newkom

07/24/2007  4:58PM

I wish my uncle were still
around. He did mining law in
Nevada and he was a "whiz"
 By Michael Miller

07/23/2007  3:17PM

To offer an explanation to Rick (following two entries):

OUTRAGE OR PARTICIPATION IN JUDICIAL DEBATE IS FOREIGN TO AMERICANS

We fight, feud and rant about the behavior of Presidents, Governors and Congressmen. But for lawyers, Americans crack jokes as if everyone knows the judicial players are inherently corrupt and always worth a laugh. Why bother pursuing this playground in America’s democracy? Lawyers lie and mislead each other, their clients and the Court. Judges, once appointed, rarely have an opponent in elections. Maybe they remember what it was like before they assumed the privilege of wearing the black robe.

It’s a word game and hard for most non-lawyers to play. Anyway if Joe and Jane average American get into it with “them”, they stick together against anyone wanting to rock their fraternity.

Or so it seems. In our case three lawyers working for Californians decided against the wisdom of many familiar with the law, facts and evidence of the proceedings that were appealed for their review. In the November 5, 2002 Election Ronald B. Robie, a candidate for California State Court of Appeals (District 3), wrote in his campaign literature, “Whenever an appellate court reverses, it almost always allows the trial court to rehear the case using the correct law and procedures.”

Ronald B. Robie continues in his published statement. “All justices are bound to apply the law whether or not they personally agree with it. Justices may not substitute their own ideas for what the law should be, but are bound by the federal and state constitutions, statutes, and other rules and regulations enacted by those with the authority to do so, including the State Legislature and the voters by initiative. Justices must enforce all laws without being swayed by public opinion. The Code of Judicial Ethics requires all justices to “be faithful to the law regardless of partisan interests, public clamor or fear of criticism….”

Well, dear reader, who will evaluate the veracity of now justice Robie’s pre election campaign statements? He will continue to be unopposed, and his name, like all unopposed judges up for election, will not only have no opponent but will not appear on the ballot. Boy, those good old boys in Congress and the Executive branch continue to protect the brotherhood of lawyers.

Rick, I know the outrage because people offer their outrage to me constantly. Where are the voices, our leaders? I don’t have the answer. It appears to me that those men and women that are intellectually and financially capable of changing the appalling state of the law remain silent. There are two non-profit foundations that profess to advocate for American constitutional freedoms. Lawyers run them. Both have expressed concern for SLAPP legislation and its chilling effect on public participation. Both have taken a wait and see approach whether the California Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals. I have been told that it is very unlikely to happen. If it does not happen, three lawyers, now judges, will have twisted the intent of the California legislature and its statutes. Maybe Americans have it right. WHY BOTHER.
 By Rick

07/21/2007  8:22PM

It's frustrsting when I post a heavy topic and nobody chimes in. Where are you?
 By martin newkom

07/17/2007  12:50PM

Good luck with the state sup.
ct. on the latest pet. You are
going to need it. The last
unfavorable ruling was an
effort to protect and sanctify
all prosecutors whithersoever
disbursed. mjn
 By SCOOP

07/17/2007  11:11AM

Our latest filing....

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL M. MILLER, et al.,
Plaintiff and Respondent
v.
GALE FILTER, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants

From Third District
Court Of Appeal
No. C051696

OBJECTIONS TO APPELLANTS’ ANSWER TO PETITION FOR
REVIEW FILED BY RESPONDENT
ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE MINE, INC.

Appeal From Sierra County Superior Court,
Honorable Stanley C. Young, Judge

DOWNEY BRAND LLP
TORY E. GRIFFIN (SBN 186181)
555 Capitol Mall, Tenth Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814-4686
Telephone: (916) 444-1000
Facsimile: (916) 444-2100
Email: tgriffin@DowneyBrand.com

KLAUS J. KOLB (SBN 146531)
400 Capitol Mall, 11th Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814
Telephone: (916) 558-6160
Facsimile: (916) 492-0598
Email: KJKLaw@sbcglobal.net

Attorneys for Respondent
ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE MINE, INC.

OBJECTIONS TO APPELLANTS’ ANSWER
TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

The Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc. (“Mine”), plaintiff and respondent, is mindful of the instructions in the Court’s letter of June 20, 2007, that any Reply to an Answer filed in response to the Mine’s petition for review should be “limited to the additional issues presented in the answer, if any.” California Rule of Court (“CRC”), Rules 8.500(e)(5), 8.504(a). Appellants’ Answer does not appear to raise any additional issues desired for review if the Mine’s Petition for Review is granted. The Mine therefore has resisted the temptation to respond to legal arguments and issues raised in the Answer, even though the Mine disagrees with much of the argument and legal analysis presented in the Answer.
However, CRC Rule 8.204 also requires that allegations of fact be limited to matters in the record, and that allegations of fact be supported by citations to the record. Appellants’ Answer to the Mine’s Petition for Review includes allegations about the Mine’s position in the trial court and the Court of Appeal that are not supported by citations to the record and that affirmatively misrepresent the Mine’s position on two issues that are critical to the Mine’s Petition for Review. The Mine therefore submits these Objections to Appellants’ Answer, limited to correcting those misrepresentations of the record.

1. CDAA Defendants Falsely Allege That The Mine Failed To Argue Below That CDAA Defendants’ Conduct Was Not Constitutionally Protected.

CDAA Defendants (Appellants) argue in their Answer to the Mine’s Petition for Review (at IV.A.3, p. 7) that:

[T]he Mine argues that the anti-SLAPP statute should not apply here because government speech and conduct are not constitutionally protected speech. (Mine’s Petition, at 5, 6.) However, that new issue should not be considered by this Court because it was not timely raised in the Court of Appeal.

CDAA’s assertion is a complete misrepresentation of the record. The Mine repeatedly and adamantly argued to the Court of Appeal that CDAA Defendants’ conduct in wrongfully attempting to criminally prosecute plaintiffs (including the Mine) was not protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and petition. For example, heading A.2. of the Mine’s Respondent’s Brief (at p. 25) states:

CDAA defendants do not qualify for the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute because they have no constitutional right to illegally impersonate district attorneys or to conduct a criminal prosecution of plaintiffs.

The Mine’s Respondent’s Brief follows up (at p. 26) by expressly arguing:

Nothing in the California or U.S. Constitutions provides a private entity with the right to unlawfully cloak itself with the authority and power of the government and to criminally prosecute another citizen.

And (at pp. 36-37):

Rather than engaging in free speech or petitioning the government for some action, CDAA defendants took over a portion of the government, and misused the government’s prosecutorial powers to initiate and pursue criminal charges against plaintiffs. .... [Italics in original.]

* * *

In this case, the CDAA defendants’ activity that gave rise to plaintiff’s damages and this action is that defendants unlawfully assumed the powers of the Sierra County District Attorney, in violation of the law and in violation of the express requirements of their Contract with Cal-OSHA. The defendants’ acts underlying plaintiffs’ cause of action do not constitute protected speech or petitioning, ....


The Mine repeated the argument again in its Answer to Amicus Curiae Brief Of Attorney General, for example, at page 9:

Unless defendants or the Attorney General first prove that defendants’ conduct in unlawfully assuming the powers of a district attorney to wrongfully prosecute Respondent was in furtherance of their valid exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and petition, the Attorney General must wait for another motion in another forum to argue for expanding the scope of prosecutorial immunity. For the reasons already set forth in Respondent’s Brief at 21-38, neither defendants nor the Attorney General are entitled to reach the issue of prosecutorial immunity in this case, because this case does not arise from conduct by defendants that is protected by the constitutional rights of free speech or petition.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal’s Opinion itself is unambiguously predicated on the same premise challenged by the petitioner in Vargas v. City of Salinas, Supreme Court No. S140911
– i.e., that government conduct qualifies as constitutionally protected speech or petition rights for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.

The Court of Appeal’s decision found that CDAA defendants were de facto government employees so their criminal prosecution of plaintiffs was lawful (e.g., Opinion at 11), and that CDAA defendants were “uncompensated public officers” and therefore were entitled to “the absolute immunity granted by Government Code section 821.6” for any illegal conduct they committed during the course of their criminal prosecution of plaintiffs (e.g., Opinion at 24). The Court of Appeal’s published opinion ultimately holds that the anti-SLAPP statute requires dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint because: (1) initiating and conducting a criminal prosecution qualifies as conduct protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and petition for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute; and (2) as de facto government employees, CDAA defendants are absolutely immune for any illegal conduct committed in the course of that criminal prosecution, so plaintiffs have no probability of success on the merits. The Court of Appeal’s published opinion ordering the trial court to grant CDAA defendants’ motion to dismiss therefore brings this appeal squarely within the grounds for review raised in the Petition for Review granted by this Court in Vargas, supra.
Throughout this litigation, the Mine repeatedly challenged CDAA defendants’ claim that their criminal prosecution of plaintiffs was “in furtherance of [CDAA Defendants’] right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution ...” as required by the anti-SLAPP statute, C.C.P. §425.16, subds. (a) and (b)(1). The Mine reminded the Court of Appeal of its position once more in the Mine’s petition for rehearing (at 6):

As the Court is well aware, Respondent contends that the anti-SLAPP statute is not available to the CDAA defendants because there is no constitutional right to criminally prosecute a fellow citizen, and because, even if there were, CDAA defendants did not have a constitutional right to initiate and carry out a criminal prosecution of plaintiffs in violation of Government Code §24102, which expressly required that defendants “shall not act as deputy until: [] (a) A written appointment by the deputy’s principal is filed with the county clerk; ... [and] [] The deputy has taken the oath of office ....” [Emphasis added.]

The assertion in CDAA Defendants’ Answer that the Mine’s Petition for Review either contradicts its position below, or that the Mine waived or forfeited the arguments raised in the Petition for Review by failing to raise them below, are contradicted by the record and are just plain wrong.
2. The Mine’s Petition For Review Is Not Based On Inadmissible Evidence.

CDAA Defendants’ Answer to the Mine’s Petition for Review also argues that the Mine’s challenge to CDAA’s conduct is based on inadmissible evidence. Answer To Petition For Review at 9. CDAA’s Answer reveals that the facts relevant to the key issues presented for review are largely undisputed.
As noted in the Mine’s Petition for Rehearing filed with the Court of Appeal, the Mine contends that the Court of Appeal ignored evidence and permissible inferences from evidence, even though the Court initially acknowledged the existence of that evidence. For example, the Court of Appeal initially (at page 6) recognized that:

According to plaintiffs, defendants knew that they lacked the lawful authority to prosecute plaintiffs and also knew that they lacked probable cause, but prosecuted the action anyway in order to gain notoriety and destroy plaintiff’s financial viability.

The remainder of the Court of Appeal’s opinion then appears to ignore this evidence.
However, it is misleading and inaccurate for CDAA Defendants to suggest that the Court of Appeal ruled that all of the Mine’s evidence was inadmissible. In fact, the Court of Appeal did not address the following undisputed evidence presented in the trial court and summarized in the Mine’s Respondent’s Brief, Answer to Amicus Curiae Brief of Attorney General, and again in the Mine’s Petition for Rehearing:

(1) CDAA, a private entity, had a financial incentive to initiate a prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One regardless of the merits of that prosecution, because CDAA was attempting to demonstrate that it deserved an extension of its contract with the Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”) (3 C.T. 459, 456, 458; 4 C.T. 827, 979);

(2) CDAA pressed for a criminal prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One Mine despite the fact that the state and federal agencies responsible for investigating worker safety at the Mine had concluded that there were no “willful” violations of any safety regulations at the Mine (3 C.T. 476, 481-84; 4 C.T. 810, 818, 829-830, 899-909; Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Exs. 2, 3);

(3) It is undisputed that the Sierra County District Attorney did not request assistance from CDAA and expressed no desire to prosecute Original Sixteen-To-One Mine during the almost thirteen months between the date of the accident and the date CDAA representatives personally “presented” their proposed criminal prosecution to the District Attorney. It is also undisputed that no written appointments of CDAA defendants were ever prepared by the District Attorney or filed with the county clerk, as required by Government Code §24102.

(4) CDAA defendants’ declarations provide evidence that defendants were acting without the supervision or direction of the district attorney, in that they omit virtually any mention of supervision, control, or even interaction with the District Attorney (2 C.T. 422-24; 434-437; 442-443; 3 C.T. 449-450);

(5) CDAA initiated an improper prosecution and improperly obtained an indictment, which the Superior Court subsequently dismissed due to CDAA’s misconduct before the grand jury (1 C.T. 81-88), and which the newly elected District Attorney chose not to pursue (4 C.T. 827, 992-993; 2 C.T. 280).

Although the Court of Appeal based its decision almost exclusively on the declarations submitted by CDAA defendants – including the portions of those declarations that supposedly repeat statements made by the Sierra County District Attorney and other Sierra County representatives – the Court of Appeal expressly ruled (Opinion at 14, fn. 4) that declarations by Mine representatives and local newspapers about contrary statements made by the Sierra County District Attorney were inadmissible hearsay because:
There is no evidence that [District Attorney] O’Sullivan was defendants’ agent or that they authorized her to speak on their behalf. (See Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 1222, p. 159.)

The statements by District Attorney O’Sullivan that the Court of Appeal rejected as hearsay include (but are not limited to) statements to the effect that: “CDAA came to her with a completed investigation proposing to file criminal charges ... and forced their way into Sierra County” (4 C.T. 810, 812; 3 C.T. 465; 2 C.T. 449, 436); the elected District Attorney “wanted nothing to do with the issue and saw no crime ...” and “said she was not participating in the case ....” (4 C.T. 778-780, 810, 812-13, 819-820, 843; 2 C.T. 270).
The Court of Appeal found that CDAA defendants were acting on behalf of District Attorney O’Sullivan after she “appointed” them (Opinion at 23) – notwithstanding the missing appointment papers – and that CDAA defendants “assumed the responsibility and duties of prosecuting the criminal action against Miller and the Mine as deputy district attorneys” (Opinion at 24). Given the Court of Appeal’s findings, the Mine does not understand how that court could simultaneously conclude that the District Attorney was not authorized to speak on behalf of her deputies about the criminal prosecution that they supposedly were carrying out on the District Attorney’s behalf. See Evidence Code §1222.1 However, even assuming that a District Attorney needs express authorization from her deputies to comment about a case being handled by her deputies, and that failure to do so makes the District Attorney’s public statements about that case inadmissible hearsay, the Mine has presented sufficient other admissible – and largely undisputed – evidence to support the issues it has raised in its Petition for Review. It is therefore inaccurate and misleading for CDAA defendants to assert that the Mine’s Petition for Review depends on inadmissible evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner Mine objects to unsupported factual allegations made by CDAA Defendants in their Answer to the Petition for Review filed by the Mine. The Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., therefore respectfully requests that the Court disregard assertions made by CDAA defendants that are contradicted by uncontroverted citations to the record, including to the Briefs and the Petition for Rehearing filed by the Mine with the Court of Appeal in this action. For the reasons set forth in its Petition for Review, the Mine respectfully requests the Court to grant its Petition, and to permit the Mine to address the CDAA defendants’ arguments more fully in future briefs to be presented to the Court after the Court has had an opportunity to consider many of the same issues raised in the pending Vargas v. City of Salinas petition for review.
Respectfully submitted July 16, 2007,
______________________________
Klaus J. Kolb
Attorney for Respondent
ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE
MINE, INC.
______________________________

DOWNEY BRAND LLP
Tory E. Griffin
Attorney for Respondent
ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE
MINE, INC.

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
The text of “OBJECTIONS TO APPELLANTS’ ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BY RESPONDENT
ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE MINE, INC.,” consists of 2,278 words, as counted by the Corel WordPerfect version 12 word-processing software I used to generate this Brief.
Dated: July 16, 2007.
______________________________
Klaus J. Kolb
Attorney for Respondent
ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE
MINE, INC.
 By Rick

07/15/2007  9:37PM

Martin, yes most do, and accept it as a "what-ever".

This is the shame.

This is why it's prudent to talk about the CDAA's attempt to circumvent the Constitution. Also, crucial to bring to light how the current administration (albeit hated by the ill-informed), has our individual rights in concern, and why the Wall Street Journal published the piece that points this out.

I believe the current administration has our Constitutional rights as a primary focus, and not a right- wing legacy or crazy zealot adgenda in mind.

In the Wall Street Journal article (below topic), this fraud has been flagged, and it points out the administration's focus to bring it to light.

Our mission is take a proactive position: to actively show our friends and neighbors how such passive acceptance of such actions by vigilante "focus groups" (that can be pronounced another way) will bite us all in the ass unless checked and rejected.

Let's ask ourselves, "How does a non-Constitutional self-appointed vigilante group of thugs get away with charging innocent citizens of manslaughter!!!???"

...while knowingly misleading a grand jury...then saying to the court "whatever"...

Whether liberal or conservative, we need to recognize how such evil entities are in place.


Remember, "when Rome sleeps..." and the historic result.
 By martin newkom

07/15/2007  8:42PM

Doesnt everyone know that most
litigation attys. will lie and
lie repeatedly to win their
point and case?
 By Rick

07/14/2007  6:51PM

When we recognized the breach of law by the CDAA in the fraudulent prosecution of this mine and its CEO and mine manager for thetr fraudulent fairy-tale breaches of law, no-where on the radar was a subsequent irrational decision by the district Court.

Initially, my question was: "Why? The CDAA broke the intention of the law, as their trumped charges were previously recognized as fraud and untrue, yet they proceded."

Then we endured our challenge. As asserted by the CDAA, and that although they were fraudulent and criminal, they had prosicutorial immunity from financial liability. The circuit court found some quick-sand and bailed, essentially caving to a higher authority, which is where this whole thing now rests.

This is of national importance, essentially a Constitution crisis in the "n"th degree.

Now, the Wall Street Journal has the fortitude to publish Executive Branch (W) concerns in this arena (please read the latest posting).

I believe that this current battle waged by MMM and the Original Sixteen to One Mine against the vigilante prosecution by the fraudulent CDAA will become the poster-front so well illustrated in the Wall Street Journal editorial. As citizens, this is our cause and rally.
 By SCOOP

07/11/2007  2:26PM

Anyone who is interested in what happened in Sierra County is encouraged to file letters in support of the petition for review. Letters should be sent A.S.A.P.

The Supreme Court has assigned the petition for review No. S153654 – Michael M. Miller, et al., vs. Gale Filter, et al. An amicus curiae letter in support of the petition for review may be filed by anyone – the person filing need not be a lawyer. The letter may not incorporate documents by reference (other than to refer to documents already filed in the case), and it must “describe the interest” of the person submitting the letter (why he or she is interested in the appeal). The letter does not need to follow any other formalities, and should be relatively short (1-3 pages), with an argument focused on why the Supreme Court should accept review, rather than on why the Court of Appeal was wrong (although these may overlap). A copy of the letter must be served on each party to the action (sample below)and an original and eight copies must be sent to the Supreme Court. The address for the Supreme Court is: Supreme Court of the State of California, 900 N Street, Room 400, Sacramento, CA 95814.

Sample proof of service: Use copy and paste or e-mail corp@origsix.com and we will send a word document to you that is better formatted.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Court and Case No: SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. S153654

Case Name: MICHAEL M. MILLER, et al. v. GALE FILTER, et al.

I am a citizen of the United States, employed in ______________ County, California. My business address is: ____________________________________________. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the above-entitled action. On: ____________________________, 2007, I served the following documents in the manner listed below:

Letter In Support Of Petitions For Review By ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE MINE, INC., and Michael M. Miller

MANNER OF SERVICE

XX U.S. MAIL: By placing a true copy of the above documents into a sealed envelope, addressed as listed below, with the proper first-class postage affixed, and then depositing the envelope in a U.S. mail box on the date indicated above.

PERSONAL SERVICE: By causing a true copy of the above documents to be personally delivered by hand to the offices of:

OTHER: By causing a true copy of the above documents to be delivered to the addressee(s) listed below by and/or through:

PARTIES SERVED AND ADDRESSES

Thomas S. Knox, Esq. Attorney for Defendants
KNOX, LEMMON & ANAPOLSKY, LLP Gale Filter, Denise Mejlszenkier,
One Capitol Mall, Suite 700 Anthony Patchett, Kyle Hedum,
Sacramento, CA 95814-3229 California District Attorneys’ Association

Michael M. Miller Plaintiff and Respondent in pro per
Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc. President, Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc.
P.O. Box 941
Alleghany, CA 95910

William N. Brieger, Esq. Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Deputy Attorney General Attorney General of the State of California
1300 I Street
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550

Klaus J. Kolb, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
400 Capitol Mall, 11th Floor Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc.
Sacramento, CA 95814

Sierra County Superior Court
P.O. Box 476
Downieville, CA 95936

PROOF OF SERVICE

Supreme Court Of The State Of California Original plus 8 copies
900 N Street, Room 400
Sacramento, CA 95814-4869



I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this July _____, 2007 in SACRAMENTO, California.

_______________________________________
 By Rick

06/22/2007  6:44PM

On the eve of our shareholder's meeting, just in case I can't make it up to the mine-site (although I plan to be there), I want to chime in on the latest chapter in the legal arena....

Any of us who know the history of the mine, and mainly the history of California gold-mining and all the subsequent issues that arise (take the rising of the city of San Francisco for example and the legal sortings that eventually played through), know that litigation has always been a necessary obstacle to the ultimate success. Gold mining has a way of transcending the litigation, all the while enduring it's inevitability.

Reviewing the countless episodes of historic gold-ming booms, how miners would leave given diggins and seek richer ground, one has only to follow the money to see where other riches were realized...usually not from those who mined the gold, but where those who knew how to exploit the situation set their traps and watched.

On to the next derivative: the salted mine and the modern hype eventually exposing nothing but a hole in the ground and a hole in the investor's pocket-book, how even today we've witnessed and continue to watch the modern version of snake-oil mining. Many, many speculations and only a very few true ventures. All we need to do is reseach recent fraudulent gold-mining-potentials to see how the money is made on speculation, not on true production and historic ore.

(Right now is where I should make clear that the Original Sixteen to One has the true track record of real mining. Anyone reading this blind, without knowing the historical reality of real-life-gold-mining and historical production of the Original Sixteen to One Mine, those of you new here and checking everything out, this mine is for real.)

Given the topic title under which I'm writing this right now, there's just one more thing I need to comment on:

Throughout history the opportunists have come in all disguises, usually the salted mine frauds. Yet in the case of this mine, there has been an assault by an opportunist which hasn't been trying to sell a fake mine, instead taking advantage of potential political potential by attempting to shut it down through illegal tampering with a Grand Jury, since then now exposed...their actions through entirely fraudulent methods, mis-using the legal system, hoping to capture political capital rather than the traditional money angle.

Above, I mentioned litigation attempts to influence gold-mining success, and the Sixteen to One Mine has endured nothing new in the history of fraudulent attempts to prosper from the desk of a crook.

This is why I write tonight. I supported and continue to support every action the President and CEO of the Original Sixteen to One Mine, as well as the Board of Director's decisions in this regard.

We will always encounter crooks. The day a mine rolls over and watches the crooks operate is the day that mine will sign the "deep-enough" grave-stone.

Fortunately, this mine and it's director and it's back-bone is strong.
 By Michael Miller

06/20/2007  11:32AM

THE TWO BRIEFS DESCRIBED BELOW CAN BE FOUND UNDER THE 'NEWS' HEADING.
 By Michael Miller

06/19/2007  3:24PM

On June 18,2007, a Petition for Review by Respondent Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc. was filed in the Supreme Court of the State of California. Attorneys for Respondent are Downey Brand LLP (Tory E. Griffin) and Klaus Kolb.

The issues presented are:
(1) Can defendants who unlawfully took over the power and authority of the Sierra County District Attorney, in violation of the express requirements of Government Code 24102 and in direct violation of their contract with the State, and who abused the powers reserved to an elected district attorney in order to pursue a baseless and malicious criminal prosecution against plaintiffs, use the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute to dismiss plaintiffs’ subsequent suit for damages and obtain an award of attorneys’ fees against plaintiffs?

(2) Should California’s “de facto officer” doctrine be extended to automatically and as a matter of law entitle a private party who unlawfully exercises the powers of an elected prosecutor to the same absolute immunity otherwise reserved for the duly appointed public employees?

WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED

1. The Court of Appeal’ s opinion is a dangerous precedent because it makes every suit challenging an abuse or usurpation of government power subject to the anti-SLAPP statute.

2. The Court of Appeal’s opinion vastly expands the “de facto officer doctrine” to immunize private parties who unlawfully assume and unlawfully exercise government power.

On June 18, 2007, Michael M. Miller filed a petition for review as plaintiff and involuntary respondent with the same Court. The issues presented are;
(1) Can the anti-SLAPP statute be applied to a pro per party who had taken defendants’ default before the anti-SLAPP motion was filed, when defendants’ default was not set aside until after the Superior Court had entered its order denying the anti-SLAPP motion?
(2) Can private prosecutors who were never appointed to act as deputy district attorneys in Sierra County escape all responsibility for the damages they caused by maliciously conducting a baseless and illegal criminal prosecution of a private citizen?

WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED

1. Defendants had no right to file an anti-SLAPP motion against plaintiff Miller, and the Superior Court had no jurisdiction to rule on it, when the anti-SLAPP motion was filed while defendants were in default.
2. Defendants should not be entitled to automatic and absolute immunity for the harm they caused Miller and the Mine in this case.
 By Michael Miller

05/24/2007  4:58PM

California Rules of Court allow a party to petition for rehearing within 15 days after the filing of a decision. If the court does not rule on the petition before the decision is final, the petition is deemed denied. Klaus Kolb, attorney for Respondent, Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc (the mine) filed a Petition for Rehearing yesterday, May 23, 2007. Michael M. Miller, a co-plaintiff with the mine but not a party to the anti-SLAPP motion filed a petition to correct the record.

The petition follows. You are invited to review and evaluate our beliefs and position. Legal scholars have begun to decipher the laws and statutes of legislation that promulgated the SLAPP. Has the language of the statute evolved as the 3rd Court of Appeals panel interprets the facts of this case? Is this the intent of the legislation?

California's anti-SLAPP statue provides for a special motion to strike a complaint where the complaint arises from conduct that falls within the rights of petition and free speech. The statue was first enacted in 1992. The concept of SLAPP was created to protect individuals’ and the public’s civil and constitutional rights against frivolous lawsuits. Should the Court of Appeals be allowed to make legal precedent with its disposition? If so, the judicial branch will have cast aside what the executive and legislative branches of our government have sworn an oath to protect.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

MICHAEL M. MILLER, et al.,
Appeal No. C051696
Plaintiff and Respondent

From Sierra County
Superior Court Case
No. 6293
v.
GALE FILTER, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants

PETITION FOR REHEARING
BY RESPONDENT
ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE MINE, INC.

Appeal From Sierra County Superior Court,
Honorable Stanley C. Young, Judge

KLAUS J. KOLB (SBN 146531)
400 Capitol Mall, 11th Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814
Telephone: (916) 558-6160
Facsimile: (916) 492-0598
Attorney for Respondent

ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE MINE, INC.

INTRODUCTION

Respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., respectfully submits this Petition for Rehearing to address two issues that appear to be based on errors about facts presented in the record for this appeal.
First, the Court’s May 8, 2007 Opinion concludes that plaintiff Michael M. Miller is a party to this appeal, apparently because the Court found no citation to the record or legal analysis to the contrary. Respondent respectfully suggests that the Court overlooked the portions of Respondent’s Brief that provides the relevant record citations showing that Mr. Miller had obtained a default against all defendants before defendants purported to serve their anti-SLAPP motion, and that default was not set aside until after the Superior Court granted the anti-SLAPP motion. The Superior Court therefore had no jurisdiction to consider defendants anti-SLAPP motion as to Mr. Miller, and Respondent’s Brief notes that there is no evidence in the record that the Superior Court actually did so.
Second, the Court’s May 8, 2007 Opinion initially (at page 6) recognizes that:

According to plaintiffs, defendants knew that they lacked the lawful authority to prosecute plaintiffs and also knew that they lacked probable cause, but prosecuted the action anyway in order to gain notoriety and destroy plaintiff’s financial viability.

However, when the Court later discusses defendants’ claims to anti-SLAPP protection and to prosecutorial immunity as de facto prosecutors, the Court appears to summarize plaintiffs’ opposition as based “simply because the district attorney neglected to file her written appointments of the CDAA employees as deputy district attorneys ....” Opinion at 9. Respondent respectfully suggests that the Court’s analysis of defendants’ claims to prosecutorial immunity and the anti-SLAPP statute overlooked the evidence and reasonable inferences from evidence that would allow a jury to conclude that defendants knew their conduct in prosecuting plaintiffs was unlawful – evidence and inferences that are in addition to the fact that CDAA defendants violated the express command of Government Code §24102 by acting as deputy district attorneys without ensuring that a written appointment existed and had been filed with the county clerk.

ARGUMENT
1. Defendants had no right to file an anti-SLAPP motion against Mr. Miller, and the Superior Court had no jurisdiction to rule on it, when the anti-SLAPP motion was filed while defendants were in default.

Near the conclusion of the Court’s Opinion (at page 26), the Court concludes:

Due to the absence of any analysis, relevant legal authority, and citations to the material facts in the record to support a contrary conclusion, we find that Miller is a proper party on appeal.

Respondent respectfully suggests that the Court’s conclusion about the absence of any analysis or citations to the material facts in the record to support a contrary conclusion is inaccurate.1 Respondent’s Brief explains, over the course of two and one-half pages (pp. 19-21) and with specific citations to the record, that plaintiff Michael M. Miller took the default of CDAA defendants on February 28, 2005, and that defendants’ motion to set aside the default was not granted until December 29, 2005. 1 C.T. 239-240; 11 C.T. 2782-84. Respondent’s Brief also explains that defendants did not file their anti-SLAPP motion until March 9, 2005, and that the Court ruled on defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion on December 1, 2005. R.T. 57-121; 11 C.T. 2777-2781. Respondent’s Brief further explains that defendants did not file a separate anti-SLAPP motion against Mr. Miller after their default was set aside, and that Mr. Miller did not participate in the briefing or hearing on defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. R.T. 57-121.
Respondent’s explanation apparently was sufficiently specific that Appellant’s Reply Brief devoted a separate major heading and three pages of the Reply Brief to addressing the issue of whether Mr. Miller was a proper party to the appeal. See heading “I. MICHAEL MILLER IS A RESPONDENT IN THIS CASE,” Reply Brief at 3-6. Notably, defendants do not contest the facts recited in Respondent’s Brief, and expressly acknowledge that Mr. Miller had obtained a default against defendants before defendants filed their anti-SLAPP motion, and that the Superior Court did not indicate its intent to set aside the default until October 19, 2005, after all briefing on the anti-SLAPP motion had been completed. Reply Brief at 4-5, also providing specific citations to the record at 1 C.T. 239, 11 C.T. 2782. Defendants do not dispute the indisputable fact that the Superior Court’s order granting their motion to set aside Mr. Miller’s default was not entered until after defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion had been denied by the Court.
It is well-established black letter law that entry of default instantaneously cuts off a defendant’s right to participate in the action until either the default is set aside, or a default judgment is entered. See, e.g., Weil and Brown, California Practice Guide Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group Rev. #1 2006) “Defaults,” 5:6, p.5-2. As was explained in W.A. Rose Co. v. Municipal Court (Fitzsimmons) (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 67, 71-73:

The subsequent untimely filings ... did not affect the duty of the clerk to enter default when requested, nor did they restore the jurisdiction to the court which was lost when default should have been entered.

In this case, it is undisputed that the clerk entered a default against defendants before they filed their anti-SLAPP motion, and the Court did not enter an order setting aside the default until after the Court had decided the anti-SLAPP motion. According to well-settled California law, the Superior Court had no jurisdiction to consider defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to Mr. Miller, and Mr. Miller had no obligation to respond to the anti-SLAPP motion. The record demonstrates that Mr. Miller did not respond, and the record reveals no evidence that the Superior Court entered an order denying the anti-SLAPP motion as to Mr. Miller, as distinct from the Original Sixteen-To-One Mine.
In light of the undisputed procedural history summarized in Respondent’s Brief, supported by specific citations to the record, and the fact that well-settled California law holds that a default deprives a court of jurisdiction to consider any subsequently filed or served motions until the default is set aside, Respondent’s counsel thought it sufficient to mention in a footnote that “there has been no order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion with respect to Mr. Miller.” Respondent’s Brief at 2, fn. 2. Respondent’s counsel apologizes for not briefing the matter more extensively. However, the fact that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the anti-SLAPP motion with respect to Mr. Miller means that there could be no appeal of a nonexistent order granting the motion with respect to Mr. Miller, which means that this Court does not have jurisdiction to order that the anti-SLAPP motion be granted as to Mr. Miller. Further, as a purely equitable matter, it would be highly unfair to direct the Superior Court to consider awarding attorneys’ fees against Mr. Miller on a motion that defendants had no right to serve on Mr. Miller, that the Superior Court had no jurisdiction to consider as to Mr. Miller, and that Mr. Miller did not have an opportunity to oppose in his own name, either in writing or at the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion.

2. Plaintiffs presented admissible evidence and reasonable inferences from admissible evidence sufficient to show “a probability” of prevailing against defendants’ affirmative defense of prosecutorial immunity.

As the Court is well aware, Respondent contends that the anti-SLAPP statute is not available to the CDAA defendants because there is no constitutional right to criminally prosecute a fellow citizen, and because, even if there were, CDAA defendants did not have a constitutional right to initiate and carry out a criminal prosecution of plaintiffs in violation of Government Code §24102, which expressly required that defendants “shall not act as deputy until: [] (a) A written appointment by the deputy’s principal is filed with the county clerk; ... [and] [] The deputy has taken the oath of office ....” [Emphasis added.] Since defendants never argued – let alone established – that Government Code §24102 was itself unconstitutional, how can doing an act in express violation of a statute be constitutionally protected? See, e.g., Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 819 (“If the defendant’s act is not constitutionally protected how can doing the act be ‘in furtherance’ of the defendant’s constitutional rights?”). There is no evidence that a written appointment of CDAA defendants was ever prepared by the Sierra County District Attorney, and it is undisputed that no such written appointment was ever filed with the Sierra County Clerk. 1 C.T. 11-17, 44-45; 4 C.T. 810, 811-12, 836-37. 2
In any event, even if the Court concludes that defendants’ conduct of acting as deputy district attorneys in violation of Government Code §24102 constituted “the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances” (C.C.P. §425.16, subd. (a); Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 313, 317-18), CDAA defendants are not entitled to an order dismissing this action unless defendants prove that plaintiffs do not have “a probability of success” in defeating defendants’ affirmative defense of prosecutorial immunity. Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1997) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1122; Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 464, 477 (placing duty of proving affirmative defense on defendant).
In this case, the Court’s Opinion appears to assume that plaintiffs’ only objection to CDAA defendants’ conduct was “simply because the district attorney neglected to file her written appointments of the CDAA employees as deputy district attorneys, ....” See, e.g., Opinion at 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 21. As noted above, there is absolutely no evidence that the district attorney ever prepared written appointments, so it is not merely a failure to file written appointments with the county clerk that is at issue. Secondly, Government Code §24102 makes it the responsibility of the prospective deputy (CDAA defendants in this case) – not the responsibility of the district attorney – to make sure that written appointments are on file with the county clerk before the prospective deputy is permitted to “act as deputy.” It is therefore exceedingly charitable and incorrect for the Court to conclude that the “technical deficiency in their [CDAA defendants’] appointment process ...is not of their own making.” Opinion at 21.
More importantly, Respondent never relied on merely a “technical deficiency ... in the appointment process” to oppose CDAA defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. As Respondent outlined in its Respondent’s Brief (at 15-18, 41-48) and again in its Answer to the Amicus Brief (at 4 and in more detail at 11-14), Respondent claims intentional wrongdoing by the CDAA defendants in addition to their failure to comply with Government Code §24102, including the following:
(1) CDAA, a private entity, had a financial incentive to initiate a prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One regardless of the merits of that prosecution, because CDAA was attempting to demonstrate that it deserved an extension of its contract with the Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”) (3 C.T. 459, 456, 458; 4 C.T. 827, 979);

(2) CDAA pressed for a criminal prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One Mine despite the fact that the state and federal agencies responsible for investigating worker safety at the mine had concluded that there were no “willful” violations of any safety regulations at the Mine (3 C.T. 476, 481-84; 4 C.T. 810, 818, 829-830, 899-909; RJN Exs. 2, 3);

(3) The Sierra County District Attorney did not request assistance from CDAA and expressed no desire to prosecute Original Sixteen-To-One Mine during the almost thirteen months between the date of the accident and the date CDAA representatives personally “presented” their proposed criminal prosecution to the District Attorney – “CDAA came to her with a completed investigation proposing to file criminal charges ... and forced their way into Sierra County” (4 C.T. 810, 812; 3 C.T. 465; 2 C.T. 449, 436);

(4) The CDAA did not carry out its prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One Mine under the supervision and control of the elected District Attorney, as required by state law and its contract with DIR, but rather pursued the prosecution despite the fact that the elected District Attorney “wanted nothing to do with the issue and saw no crime ...” and “said she was not participating in the case ....” (4 C.T. 778-780, 810, 812-13, 819-820, 843; 2 C.T. 270). The declarations submitted by CDAA defendants provide additional evidence that defendants were acting without the supervision or direction of the district attorney, in that they omit virtually any mention of supervision, control, or even interaction with the District Attorney;

(5) CDAA then initiated an improper prosecution and improperly obtained an indictment, which the Superior Court subsequently dismissed due to CDAA’s misconduct (1 C.T. 81-88), and which the newly elected District Attorney chose not to pursue (4 C.T. 827, 992-993; 2 C.T. 280).

This additional evidence of misconduct by CDAA is material to this appeal because defendants’ attempt to invoke the “de facto” officer doctrine depends on defendants proving that they “exercise[d] the duties of a public officer under color of a known and authorized appointment, ...” People v. Cradlebaugh (1914) 24 Cal.App. 489, 491. Taken as a whole, the evidence plaintiffs were able to gather at this early stage of the litigation – with virtually no discovery – is sufficient to allow a reasonable inference by a jury that CDAA defendants knew they were in violation of the requirement of their own contract with the Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”), knew that the District Attorney had not requested their assistance, knew that the District Attorney did not supervise their work, knew that the District Attorney disapproved of the prosecution of plaintiffs, knew – as supposed experts in the process of appointing deputy district attorneys – that they had not been properly appointed, and knew that at least some members of the public (including plaintiffs3) were challenging their authority to engage in the prosecutions. Furthermore, as the Court’s Opinion recognizes, the California Supreme Court has previously held that actions of a de facto officer exercising the functions of the office “ ‘ “lawfully and with the acquiescence of the public ...” ’ ” are valid and binding. Opinion at 11, citing Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Com’n (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1, 54 (other citations omitted). For the reasons outlined above, Respondents have always maintained that CDAA defendants’ conduct was unlawful for reasons that go beyond and are in addition to CDAA defendants’ unlawful exercise of power as unappointed deputy district attorneys.
The same evidence and conduct summarized above also applies to the Court’s analysis of whether “de facto” district attorneys are entitled to prosecutorial immunity. The Court’s Opinion concludes (at 22) that:

[W]here a person appointed as a deputy district attorney acts under color of authority and is performing the same function as would a de jure deputy district attorney, the person is entitled to prosecutorial immunity even if his or her appointment was irregular ....

The Court’s Opinion implies that if a deputy district attorney knows that he or she is not authorized to act, he or she is not entitled to prosecutorial immunity for the unauthorized acts. For the reasons set forth above, Respondent maintains that it has presented enough evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence to meet the “minimal merit” prong of the anti-SLAPP statute, and to show a probability of success in showing that defendants are not entitled to seek protection under the de facto officer doctrine. Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.

The same evidence also is material to the Court’s analysis of whether CDAA defendants qualify as “uncompensated public officers or public servants of the Sierra County District Attorney’s Office” within the meaning of Government Code §§810.2 and 821.6. The Court’s Opinion notes (at 23) that, “the fact they were employees of CDAA does not preclude them from being uncompensated public employees, servants, or officers within the meaning of Government Code section 810.2 and the immunity statute” (emphasis added). However, the fact that CDAA’s contract with DIR does not preclude CDAA employees from being uncompensated public employees also does not prove conclusively that they were uncompensated public employees – and CDAA defendants have the burden of proof on this affirmative defense. Defendants presented no evidence that CDAA defendants were uncompensated public employees – in fact, CDAA defendants never even cited Government Code §810.2 in their briefs to the Superior Court or the Court of Appeal. The Court’s Opinion states that defendants “acted on behalf of” District Attorney O’Sullivan, but defendants have not carried their burden of conclusively proving this with admissible evidence, and Respondent has offered sufficient evidence to allow a jury to reach a contrary conclusion, even at this early stage of the litigation.

The Court’s Opinion cites hearsay in the declarations of CDAA defendants as evidence that District Attorney O’Sullivan appointed them and approved of their activities. Opinion at 12. Those hearsay declarations obviously are not the equivalent of the appointments required by Government Code §24102. Similarly, the Court’s observation (at 13) that District Attorney O’Sullivan was “aware of the criminal action against Miller and the Mine” may allow an inference that District Attorney O’Sullivan appointed CDAA defendants to prosecute it, but it does not conclusively prove that she did so, and a jury would be permitted to draw a different inference after considering the evidence offered by Respondent. Moreover, if the hearsay declarations of CDAA defendants are admissible evidence to show that District Attorney O’Sullivan approved of CDAA defendants’ acts, and authorized them to carry out her directions, then it is inconsistent for the Court to conclude that District Attorney O’Sullivan was not authorized to make public comments about the scope of her authorization to CDAA defendants, or about their conduct in supposedly carrying out her directions. Evidence Code §1222.

California Constitution, Art. XI, §1, authorized and made District Attorney O’Sullivan responsible for any prosecution being conducted by her office. If CDAA defendants claim to have been acting as appointed deputy attorneys acting pursuant to the directions and supervision of District Attorney O’Sullivan, then they necessarily authorized District Attorney O’Sullivan to make public comments about their conduct. Accordingly, District Attorney O’Sullivan’s comments about whether and the extent to which she authorized or approved of CDAA defendants’ conduct is admissible evidence which a jury could decide to believe over the assertions of CDAA defendants. Nothing more is required to show “a probability” of success in defeating CDAA defendants’ affirmative defense of prosecutorial immunity, based on a claim to have been acting as de facto, uncompensated public employees.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc, respectfully requests the Court to grant this Petition for Rehearing. The admissible evidence cited by Respondent shows that Michael M. Miller was not a party to the anti-SLAPP motion in the Superior Court, and cannot be made a party to the anti-SLAPP motion on appeal. The admissible evidence, when considered as a whole and with all reasonable inferences in favor of Respondent, also is sufficient to show that Respondent’s claims have “minimal merit,” and “a probability” of overcoming defendants’ affirmative defenses.

Respectfully submitted May 23, 2007,
______________________________
Klaus J. Kolb
Attorney for Respondent
ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE MINE, INC.

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

The text of PETITION FOR REHEARING BY RESPONDENT ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE MINE, INC., consists of 3,500 words, as counted by the Corel WordPerfect version 12 word-processing software I used to generate this Brief.

Dated: May 23, 2007.
______________________________
Klaus J. Kolb
Attorney for Respondent
ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE MINE, INC.
 By martin newkom

05/20/2007  2:53PM

One can go to state supreme
court. there can be a reversal
there. A very minute but very
crucial issue is up: Can a
deputy DA be duly sworn if
exact prodecure is NOT followed
Calapp3 said yes. Who are they
protecting? Take your best shot. Gray Davis and every
prosecutor in Calif. not pro-
perly sworn.
 By Rick

05/18/2007  10:46PM

When I read the news, I just shook my head in dismay. It isn't because we didn't win (I think we did, regardless)...it is because all this stupid crap gets in the way.

(Everyone knows the CDAA's prosecution of the mine and MMM was faulty...heck they know it, so do all the justices.)

What bugs me most is why all of a sudden the shift goes back to the money instead of the fight for our ability to mine gold without obstruction of justice. Yes, I know...always follow the money. But, "#%$^%&#!!" doesn't the whole idea of what happened bug you?

I realize that mining gold means mining money...it's the whole reason anyone goes into business. But when the concept of conducting an honorable business is assaulted (we are talking about the most volitile of all, to date, throughout history...gold), do we just cave when we're being fleeced?

Never forget the scams and the competition by everyone trying to exploit and sell the latest snake oil, (or for that matter the latest gold discovery)....hello global warming caused by man....

Next thing we'll hear is that fighting the CDAA was all a sham, and crap and crap.

Whatever happened to the honor of doing the right thing?
 By Michael Miller

05/18/2007  12:39PM

Answer to Bluejay's question below: Maybe me.

Page 1 | Page 2 | Page 3 | Page 4 | Page 5 | Page 6 | Page 7 ]

 

  
 
© 2017 Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc.
PO Box 909
Alleghany, California 95910
 

Phone:   
Fax:
E-mail:
 
(530) 287-3223      
(530) 287-3455
corp@origsix.com
 

      Gold Sales:  


(530) 287-3540

goldsales@origsix.com
 



Design & development by
L. Kenez